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TOWARD UNIFORM APPLICATION OF A FEDERAL
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Catherine M. Baytion
Abstract. In federal courts, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs all privileges, including
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Unlike many state statutes that explicitly recognize the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and define its scope through exceptions, Rule 501 merely
directs courts to use their reason and experience to interpret common law principles. Under
this vague standard, the federal circuits lack uniformity in their treatment of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. This Comment suggests that Congress should explicitly
recognize the privilege and define its scope through exceptions. To support this conclusion,
this Comment discusses the justifications for recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
uses the paradigm of formal versus nonformal decisionmaking to examine the difficulties of
applying Rule 501 to the privilege, and takes advantage of the specific factual context of state
cases to support the establishment of certain exceptions.

Evidence rules serve multiple functions. A primary function is to
facilitate the search for truth, which is served by a general principle that
permits courts to hold witnesses in contempt if they withhold evidence
that is relevant to a litigated dispute.2 Yet conflicting functions justify
many exceptions to this general principle. The psychotherapiste-patient
privilege is one such exception. The privilege conflicts with the truth1.Jack B. Weinstein, Some Diffculties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial
Trials, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 241-243 (1966). For example, evidence rules encourage people to
take subsequent remedial measures, to compromise disputed claims, to obtain liability insurance, and
through evidentiary privileges, to establish certain confidential relationships. Robert H. Aronson,
The FederalRules of Evidence:A Modelfor Improved Evidentiary Decisionmakingin Washington,
54 Wash. L. Rev. 31, 36 (1978).
2. See In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 559 (Cal. 1970) (denying the writ of habeas corpus for an
imprisoned psychiatrist whom the lower court adjudged in contempt of court for his refusal to
provide information on a former patient).
3. This Comment uses the term "psychotherapist" broadly to include all occupations that treat
emotional and mental illnesses. Some state statutes include occupations other than psychotherapists,
psychiatrists, and psychologists under the "psychotherapist-patient privilege.' Social workers;
psychiatric nurses; counselors of rape victims; battered women; and drug and alcohol abusers; as
well as school guidance counselors and marital and family counselors arguably perform the same
functions as psychotherapists. See Catharina J.H. Dubbelday, Comment, The Psychotherapist-Client
Testimonial Privilege:Defining the ProfessionalInvolved, 34 Emory L.L 777 (1985). Whether or
not a state extends a privilege to a particular profession commonly depends on whether the state has
strict licensing requirements for that profession. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 33.18237
(West 1993) ("A psychologist licensed or allowed to use the title under this part ...shall not be
compelled to disclose confidential information.. . ."); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-109
(1993) (extending the psychiatrist-patient privilege to psychiatric nurses who are certified in
psychiatric and mental health nursing by the American Nurses' Association).
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finding process, but does so in order to promote two goals. One goal is
to foster relationships between psychotherapists and their patients, thus
promoting the effective treatment of mental and emotional conditions
A second goal is to protect privacy.
During litigation, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege protects witnesses from the public
disclosure of deeply personal thoughts and feelings communicated to
psychotherapists for the purpose of treatment. Patients who assert the
privilege may refuse to testify about communications made within the
course of treatment, and they may prohibit their psychotherapists from
testifying about the communications.6 As the patient's agent, the
psychotherapist may claim the privilege on the patient's behalf.7 In
many jurisdictions the psychotherapist is ethically bound to do so.'
As enacted, Rule 501 reads in part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the

Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in ihe light of
reasonand experience.9

4. Consistent with current methods of treatment, the definition for "rental or emotional
condition" in some statutes includes addiction to drugs or alcohol. See, e.g., Proposed Rule of
Evidence 504 (Advisory Committee's Note) (including drug abuse in order to be consistent with the
definition of "drug dependent person" in 42 U.S.C. § 201(q)).
5. Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1547 (1985).
6. See 8 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2381 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (stating that
the objective behind the attorney-client, husband-wife, and physician-patient privileges is to forbid
compulsory disclosure by the person to whom the confidential communication was made).
7. Id. § 2321 (explaining common law principles on privileges in the context of the attorney-client
privilege).
8. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2263 (peering 1992); Calif. Evid. Code Ann. § 1014 (West
1994); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 18.83.121 (1994).
9. Fed. R. Evid. 501 (emphasis added). The remainder of Rule 501 addlresses choice of law
problems between state and federal courts: "However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law." For an explanation of how Congress addressed ,hoice of law issues in
Rule 501, see generally 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstei, 's Evidence at 501-2501-30 (1977).

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Congress adopted a flexible, nonformal standard for Rule 501, and thus
avoided the difficult choices between promoting the search for truth and
granting privileges to select occupational groups. 0
In contrast with state rules explicitly recognizing the psychotherapistpatient privilege, 1 Rule 501 fails to recognize any privilege explicitly,
does not establish exceptions, and thus provides little guidance for the
federal courts. Some circuits interpret Rule 501 as prohibiting them from
recognizing any privilege not recognized in the common law during, or
prior to, the time that Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 501, however, provides that privileges are to be governed by
common law principles as they "may" be interpreted by the federal
courts, rather than as they "have been" or "were" interpreted in the past.
Therefore, other circuits interpret Rule 501 as empowering them to
recognize new privileges, including the relatively recent psychotherapistpatient privilege.
This Comment discusses the federal circuits' inconsistent application
of Rule 501 to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and uses the
paradigm of formal versus nonformal decisionmaking to conclude that
Congress should enact a specific federal rule to encourage uniformity
among the federal circuits. The provisions of a new federal rule should
be based on the justifications for the privilege. These justifications
support not only recognition of the privilege, but also the establishment
of exceptions in certain circumstances.
I.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE

Two main theories justify the psychotherapist-patient privilege-the
traditional theory formulated by an authority on evidence law, the late
Professor John H. Wigmore, and the modem privacy theory. 2 Although
some modem courts do not adhere strictly to Wigmore's justification for

10. See William L. Hungate, An Introduction to the ProposedRules ofEvidence, 32 Fed. Bar J.
225,229 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-2085 (1993); Ark. Code § 17-96-105 (Michie 1987);
Calif. Evid. Code Ann. § 1014 (West 1994); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-109 (1993); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4732.19 (Anderson 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5944 (1994); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 40-75-160 (Law. Co-op. 1991); Wilson v. Bonner, 303 S.E.2d 134, 142 (Ga. App. 1983); Carson
v. Jackson, 466 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Matter of Atkins, 316 N.W.2d 477,
483-484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Usen v. Usen, 269 N.E.2d 442, 444 (Mass. 1971).
12. See generally Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 5, at 1472-1486 (critiquing
Wigmore's theory and discussing alternative modes of analysis).
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privileges, his influence remains. 13 Professor Wigmore fornulated a test
to determine whether a privilege should be adopted. The: test is made up
of four conditions that focus on societal, in addition to individual,
interests.' 4 According to Wigmore's test, a relationship must meet all
to the relationship should be permitted
four conditions before the parties
5
to withhold relevant evidence:1
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance oF the relation
between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulouslyfostzred. (4) The
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation. 6
In most situations, the relationship between psychotherapists and
patients satisfies the first three factors of Wigmore's test. First, patients
expect their psychotherapists to maintain the privacy of their
communications; second, the successful treatment of mental and
emotional conditions depends upon confidentiality because treatment
often requires patients to reveal socially unacceptable thoughts and
feelings; 7 and third, society should foster the treatment of mentally ill

13. See, e.g., In the Matter of D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160, 164 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the statutory
alcohol treatment privilege is inapplicable in judicial proceedings related to reports of suspected
child abuse or neglect because, in that context, the privilege fails the fourth criterion of Wigmore's
test); State v. Post, 118 Wash. 2d 596, 612, 826 P.2d 172, 181, amended, 837 P.2d 599 (Wash. 1992)
(en banc) (citing the first criterion of Wigmore's test for the proposition th.t a person may claim a
privilege only for communications that originate in the confidence that they will remain
undisclosed).
An example of how legislators use Wigmore's "systemic" theory is found in the explanatory notes
of a Florida statute: "Because of the serious nature of commitment proceedings, the harm to the
psychotherapist-patientrelationship is outweighed by the harm to socieO, in general if relevant
information is excluded from them." 1976 Law Revision Council Note to Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.503(4)
(West 1994) (emphasis added).
14. Harvard Law Review Association, supranote 5, at 1472.
15. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2285 ("That [the four conditions] are present in most of the
recognized privileges is plain enough; and dhe absence of one or more of them serves to explain why
certain privileges have failed to obtain the recognition sometimes demanded for them.").
16. Id.
17. Sidney Jourard, Some PsychologicalAspectsof Privacy, 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 307, 311
(1966).

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
persons because of the potential harm that they pose to themselves and to
others.'"
The fourth condition of Wigmore's test requires a balancing of harms
and benefits. Although disclosure of communications between a
psychotherapist and patient could benefit society by assisting in the
search for truth, the harmful effect on the treatment of mental and
emotional conditions would outweigh the benefit in many cases.' 9 If
patients learn that their statements could be disclosed in legal
proceedings, they may become less willing to participate in
psychotherapy. Assurances of nondisclosure2 ° make patients more likely
to seek treatment, to communicate openly during psychotherapy, and
thus to obtain effective treatment.2' In turn, the privilege benefits society
because people who are mentally and emotionally healthy are more
likely to be productive members of society and are less likely to
endanger others.
In some situations, however, the psychotherapist-patient relationship
fails one or more of the requirements of Wigmore's four-part test. For
example, the relationship may fail to meet Wigmore's fourth condition
when a patient, during treatment, tells a psychotherapist that he intends
to kill his father.'
The benefit of disclosing this statement would
outweigh the possible harm of impairing the relationship of trust between
the psychotherapist and the patient.'

18. See Bader v. State, 43 Wash. App. 223, 227-28, 716 P.2d 925, 928 (1986) (recognizing that a
mentally disturbed person with known dangerous propensities foreseeably may cause injury to a
member of the general public).
19. Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatryand a Second Look at the MedicalPrivilege, 6 Wayne L. Rev.
175, 193 (1960).
20. The assurance of nondisclosure is never absolute because it is qualified with exceptions. See
infra part M.
21. Jourard, supra note 17, at 312. Some argue that the establishment of privileges does little to
influence behavior. See Schuman & Weiner, The PrivilegeStudy: An EmpiricalExamination ofthe
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 893, 900-04 (1982). In response to this
argument, Schuman and Weiner compiled interviews of a small sample of 121 nonprofessionals.
They found that although people were equally willing to talk regardless of whether they knew that a
privilege existed, people were significantly less willing to disclose information that could create
legal liability once told that they had no privilege. Id. at 919-20.
22. This example comes from State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. 1972). Rawland fatally
stabbed his father in the back with a butcher knife because he believed that his parents were part of a
large-scale plot to take his life.
23. See infra part lI.B.1 for a discussion of the dangerous patient exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
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Although Wigmore required that a relationship meet all four
conditions in order to merit a privilege,24 Congress should not reject the
privilege merely because the psychotherapist-patient relationship fails to
meet Wigmore's fourth condition in some circumstances. All privileges
require exceptions in some circumstances.' Wigmore himself endorsed
the well-established attorey-client privilege, while aclkowledging that
it was disputable whether the relationship met his fourth condition.26
Therefore, Congress should establish exceptions for commonly occurring
situations.27
While Wigmore's traditional theory justifies privileges by considering
primarily the benefits and harms to society, a modern privacy theory
justifies privileges because they protect the interests of the individual.28
According to the privacy theory, the right to privacy includes the right to
be free from unnecessary intrusions into one's personal life.29 The
psychotherapist-patient privilege protects this right by preventing
unnecessary intrusion into litigants' or witnesses' psychotherapeutic
histories. Courts and legislature3 use both the modem and the traditional
theories to justify recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.3"
The coexistence of the two justifications supports the theory that the rise
of the privacy rationale supplements Wigmore's traditional analysis.3
Rulemakers should consider these justifications when creating rules
on the psychotherapist-patient privilege. One paradigm that explains the
24. Wigmore, supranote 6, § 2286.
25. See, e.g., In the Matter of D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160, 163 n.4 (Alaska 1994) (recognizing that
neither the physician-patient nor the husband-wife privilege is applicable in judicial proceedings
related to reports of child abuse or neglect).
26. Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2286.
27. See infra part I.
28. The United States Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Constitution protects the right to
privacy in certain situations. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right of
personal privacy is constitutionally protected); see also Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 479 N.E.2d 674
(Mass. 1985) (holding that a court should consider the privacy concern.,: of the psychotherapistpatient privilege even during an investigation under the Medicaid False Claim Act); People v.
Caplan, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (noting the victim's constitational right to privacy in
her communications with a treating psychotherapist).
29. Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 77 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter McCormick].
30. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.503(4) (West 1976) (establishing exceptions for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege when disclosing the communications "be:ter serves the interests of
the patient and society"); see also Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786, 794 (Cal. 1992)
(explaining that the privilege permits the patient to bar evidence in ord.r to "protect his right to
privacy and promote the psychotherapeutic relationship").
31. Harvard Law Review Association, supranote 5, at 1484.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
choices available to rulemakers is formal versus nonformal
decisionmaking. This paradigm is useful for analyzing how the
psychotherapist-patient privilege has fared under Rule 501.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE UNDER RULE 501

A.

Formal Versus Nonformal Decisionmaking

All rulemakers must choose between formal and nonformal
decisionmaking.32 The formal approach takes the form of inflexible,
specific rules, which demand a particular result according to how the
facts of a case "fit" the fact patterns addressed by the rules.33 This
approach is called formal decisionmaking because the form of the rule
itself, rather than the policies behind the rule, determines the decision.
By contrast, nonformal decisionmaking permits the decisionmaker to
consider relevant policies and interests on a case-by-case basis. Both
approaches have their advantages and disadvantages.34
By permitting the decisionmaker to consider all relevant factors in
each case, the nonformal approach has the advantage of minimizing the
unjust results that strict rules sometimes produce. 35 Yet the case-by-case
approach of nonformal decisionmaking can lead to unpredictable results.
For example, the nonformal approach creates opportunities for judges'
biases to influence decisions. Furthermore, the nonformal approach
requires a decisionmaker to consider more information, making his or
her task more complex and time-consuming.
The advantages of formal rules are numerous. Formal rules minimize
alternatives and reduce the likelihood that a judge will make an
erroneous decision "in the heat of battle."36 Unlike the nonformal
approach, formal decisionmaking permits judges to consider only those
factors that the rules address. 37 Formal rules also promote predictability
by increasing the likelihood that similar cases will be decided similarly,
and they promote freedom from the arbitrary exercise of power by

32. William Powers, Formalismand Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 Wash. L.
Rev. 27,28-37 (1976).
33. Id. at28.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id. at 28.
36. Powers, supra note 32, at 28.
37. Id.
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decisionmakers3 8 Furthermore, formal rules are simpler to apply than
nonformal rules; this characteristic permits attorneys, as well as
laypersons, to predict how judges will apply the rules and to modify their
actions according to those predictions. 9
Although one advantage to formal rules is that they permit rulemakers
to enforce their values,40 this characteristic can be a drawback if societal
values change before rulemakes can agree on amendments.4' Whether
rulemakers are trying to establish or amend formal rules, they may have
difficulty reaching a consensus on specific and de:tailed provisions.
Congress enacted the current Rule 501 in part because the legislators
were unable to agree on the specific rules that the Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee proposed."2 Furthermore, formal rules can produce
results contrary to the policies that rulemakers intended. to promote.43
At the same time, the drafters of formal rules may consider all relevant
facts and policies in order to achieve results that approximate those of
nonformal decisions.' Congressional rulemakers should take advantage
of the substantial body of state case law that now exists in order to
determine which formal rules have produced just outcomes.
B.

The Role of Congress in Achieving Uniformity

One of the benefits that rulemakers hoped to attain by codifying the
Federal Rules of Evidence was uniformity.4" Rule 501's inability to
foster uniformity has made it the target for criticism by legal

38. Id. at 29-30.
39. Aronson, supranote 1, at 34.
40. For example, in order to reinforce the legitimacy of a legal rule, ajudge will apply a Statute of
Frauds to find that a contract was not formed because the parties did not write out their agreement
even though the facts of the particular case make this outcome seem unjust. Powers, supranote 32,
at 29.
41. Id. at28.
42. Hungate, supranote 10, at 229.
43. This problem with formal rules can be seen with narrow, formal hearsay exceptions. Aronson,
supra note 1, at 41. The underlying theory of excluding hearsay is that such statements are generally
untrustworthy. Id. Nevertheless, strict application of hearsay exceptions may gain the benefit of
predictability, but at the expense of excluding trustworthy statements that do not fall under the listed
exceptions. Id.
44. Powers, supra note 32, at 29.
45. Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of
Codification, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 255, 264 (1984); Hungate, supranote 10, at 228.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
commentators.46 To remedy this lack of uniformity, Congress should
take advantage of state case law to discover how state statutes on the
psychotherapist-patient privilege function. State courts have had the
opportunity to test specific statutory provisions on the privilege.47 If
Congress were to recognize explicitly the psychotherapist-patient
privilege and its exceptions, the federal circuits would become much
more uniform in their application of the privilege.
Congress is better equipped than the courts to make informed
decisions about how to foster effective treatment for mental conditions.
Congressional committees hold hearings, receive comments from
interested parties, discuss their findings, and reach conclusions. By
contrast, trial judges must make immediate decisions. Additionally, one
of the traditional justifications for privileges requires that society
consider a relationship worthy of being fostered before the relationship
can merit an evidentiary privilege. Elected members of Congress, rather
than unelected federal court judges, should make these types of policy
decisions.48
Although in theory the Supreme Court could impose uniformity on the
circuits,49 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will resolve the many
issues that trail the psychotherapist-patient privilege anytime soon."0
Years could pass before the Supreme Court may address these issues
one-by-one as individual cases move through the appellate system.5

46. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 45, at 275; Irving Younger, Introduction to a Symposium on the
FederalRules of Evidence, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 251,252 (1984).
47. See infra part I1I.
48. Unfortunately, the fact that legislators depend on votes for their jobs also makes it difficult for
them to grant evidentiary privileges only to a few, well-chosen occupational groups, when many
clamor for the privilege of maintaining the privacy of clients' communications. The difficulty of this
task, in part, led to Congress's decision to eliminate the specific rules on privileges drafted by the
Advisory Committee in 1969 as part of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See Hungate, supra
note 10, at 229. It is important to note, however, that state legislatures have been able to surpass this
difficulty and enact rules that recognize specific privileges. On the other hand, one could argue that
recognition of privileges for an increasing number of occupations by state legislatures is due more to
the fear of losing elections than to a well-reasoned evaluation of the benefits and detriments of
privileges. See Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2380a (arguing against recognition of the physicianpatient privilege by stating that "the real support for the privilege seems to be mainly the weight of
professional medical opinion pressing upon the legislature").
49. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,309 (1962).
50. See part III for a discussion of how some states address issues that commonly arise in disputes
about the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
51. Before contributing to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court added little to the
law of evidence, primarily because few cases presenting evidentiary issues reached the Supreme
Court. Justice Jackson commented, "It is obvious that a court which can make only infrequent

Washington Law Review

Vol. 70:153, 1995

Therefore, Congress should enact more specific rules to resolve the
inconsistencies among the circuits when judges apply the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
C.

Inconsistent Treatment of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
under Rule 501

In enacting Rule 501, Congress chose a nonformal approach to
decisionmaking that has resulted in inconsistent ixeatment of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the federal couits. 2 The Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits interpret Rule 501 as prohibiting them from
recognizing any privilege, including the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, which the courts rejected when evidence rules were determined
under the common law. By contrast, the Second and Sixth Circuits hold
that Rule 501 authorizes them to use reason and experience to decide
whether to recognize privileges, even those previously rejected in the
common law. 3 The differing interpretations of Rule 501 by the circuits
sallies into the field cannot recast the body of case law on this subject in many, many years even if it
were clear what the rules should be." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,486 (1948).
52. When the Proposed Rules were submitted for congressional approval, Congress replaced the
thirteen rules of proposed Article V with the current Rule 501. For various reasons, critics had
fiercely challenged proposed Article V in congressional hearings. For a omprehensive discussion
of the criticisms of Article V, see Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law:
Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1466-69 (1985). Many critics argued that
proposed Article V invalidated state-established rights of the individual. Hungate, supra note 10, at
229. The Committee on the Judiciary received a flood of letters from psychiatric organizations and
psychiatrists after it deleted Rule 504, which proposed a psychotherapist-patient privilege, from
Article V. The Committee responded:
It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to privileges, the action of
Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient...
or any other of the enumerated privileges [ofproposed Article V] ....Re.ther, our action should
be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential
relationship.., should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Fed. R. Evid. 501 (Notes of Committee on tae Judiciary Senate Report No. 93-1277).
53. At the time that Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts were rejecting a
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The privilege was not well-established in the common law
because psychotherapy did not gain recognition as a legitimate field of raedical practice until the
1950s. Jonathan Baumoel, Comment, The Beginning of the Endfor the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege,60 U. Cin.L. Rev. 797, 802 (1992); The Age ofPsychology in the UnitedStates, Life, Jan.
7, 1957, at 68. Because society was skeptical about the effectiveness of psychotherapy, judges
probably believed that little could be gained from promoting this new form oftreatment.
The Tenth Circuit has not yet had occasion to decide the question of whether to recognize the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1450 (10th Cir. 1990).
See also In Re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 262-63, (7th Cir. 1983) (decliring to decide whether to
recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege). Similarly, the First, Third, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits have not yet addressed the issue.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
shows the difficulty of applying nonformal standards. Problems in
interpreting Rule 501 could also be caused by the tension between two
competing concerns: the interest in maintaining flexibility in the law of
privileges,.4 and the interest in limiting the creation of new privileges,
s
which hinder the search for truthi
In United States v. Meagher 6 and United States v. Corona," the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, rejected a psychiatrist-patient
privilege because the common law had never recognized a physicianpatient privilege.5 8 By rejecting outright any doctor-patient privilege, the
Meagher and Corona courts never had occasion to distinguish between
treatment for mental and physical conditions. The courts, however,
neglected to note that the success of psychoanalysis and other forms of
therapy for mental conditions depends on uninhibited communication. 9
Psychiatric patients are unwilling to communicate freely unless they can
feel confident that their revelations will remain private.60
By contrast, physicians generally can treat patients with physical
illnesses without the assurance of nondisclosure.6 ' Therefore, the need
for an evidentiary privilege is stronger for relationships in the mental
health field than it is in the physical health field. 2 Although Congress
learned about this distinction from psychiatric organizations when it
considered the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 63 the nonformal language of
Rule 501 fails to convey this knowledge to the courts. The lack of
guidance in Rule 501 thus required the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits to
make decisions that Congress was better equipped to make.
In addition to its failure to distinguish between two types of treatment,
the Fifth Circuit applied a restrictive view of the common law. The court
54. United States v. Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
55. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974).
56. 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 853 (1976).
57. 849 F.2d 562 (1lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied,489 U.S. 1084 (1989).
58. Meagher,531 F.2d at 753; Corona,849 F.2d at 567.
59. Weinstein, supra note 9, at 504-4 (Report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry
92). Through Report No. 45, psychiatrists advocated the recognition of a privilege for
communications between psychiatrists and their patients.
60. Id.
61. Slovenko, supra note 19, at 180. See also McCormick, supra note 29, § 98 (discussing
favorably the argument that the treatment of mental illness involves considerations not encountered
in other medical contexts).
62. Id. at 184.
63. When the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate considered the Proposed Rules of
Evidence, they considered reports from psychiatric organizations. See, e.g., Weinstein, supranote 9,
at 504-4 (quoting a report submitted by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry).
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interpreted Rule 501 as requiring the rejection of any privilege that had
not yet been recognized in the common law at the time that the Federal
Rules of Evidence were enacted.' Yet a central characteristic of the
common law is its capacity for growth and adaptation..6 Furthermore,
the language of Rule 501 provides that privileges are to be governed by
common law principles as they "may" be interpreted by the federal
courts, rather than as they "have been" or "were" interpreted in the past.
Although Congress has the power to enact statutes that override the
common law,66 Congress deferred to the courts when it enacted Rule 501
and asked judges to apply their reason and experience to evaluate
common law rules on privileges. Neither policy nor precedent justifies
the restrictive view of the common law adopted by the Fifth Circuit. In
Trammel v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that Rule 501
"manifested an affirmative intention [on the part of Congress] not to
freeze the law of privilege."67
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in In re Grand Jury
68 rejected a psychotherapist-patient privilege because the
Proceedings
privilege had developed in state statutes, rather than in the common
law. 9 The court acknowledged that Congress intended Rule 501 to
promote flexibility by permitting the law of privilegess to develop on a
However, the court stated that Rule 501's
case-by-case basis.7"
command to interpret the principles of the common law prohibited courts
from recognizing any privilege not previously recognized in the common
law. The court stated, "if such a privilege is to be recognized in federal
criminal proceedings, it is up to Congress to define it, not this court."7 '
Although the court rejected the psychotherapist-patient privilege, it
recognized a conditional constitutional right of privacy in medical

64. United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752,753 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v. Harper,
450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971), to justify its rejection of a psychiatrist-patient privilege because "[a]t
common law, no physician-patient privilege existed.").
65. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (recognizing that personal rights had been
secured by adopting rules to fit new circumstances, and holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause does not require a grand jury indictment before the accused can be tried for
murder where the state provides other procedural protections that satisfy -'he requirements of due
process).
66. Id. at 533.
67. 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980).
68. 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,493 U.S. 906 (1989).
69. Id. at 565.
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id.
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records, thus preventing disclosure of certain records during civil
litigation. 2 Perhaps reluctant to commit itself to a clear rule until it
garnered more experience with other cases, the court rejected the
predictability that a clear privilege rule could promote, in favor of a less
clear constitutional right of privacy. The court cited its own precedent
for the common law rule that a constitutional right of privacy prevented
the disclosure of communications between psychotherapists and their
patients during civil litigation.73 Yet the court held that the right to
privacy was conditional in criminal cases, and directed its district courts
to balance the state's interest in investigating crimes against the patient's
right to privacy in his or her medical records.74
In contrast to the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second and
Sixth Circuits recognize a qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege
through Rule 501.75 In In re Doe,76 the Second Circuit recognized the
psychotherapist-patient privilege by exercising its "reason and
experience. ' 77 The court reasoned that communications between a
patient and a psychiatrist involve far more intensely personal information
than communications to other kinds of doctors.78 The court then referred
to the experience of the forty-nine states that had recognized the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 79
Such widespread recognition
suggested to the Doe court that experience with the privilege had been
favorable."0
The Doe court nevertheless admitted evidence of a witness's
psychiatric history because the court found that the need for the evidence
outweighed privacy interests.8' In Doe, because the witness initiated the
criminal investigation, the witness's credibility was a central issue in the
case. Moreover, the court noted from the record that expert psychiatrists
had testified that the witness's history of emotional illness affected his
credibility. The court also found that to prohibit any inquiry into a
72. Id. at 565 (citing Caesar v. Mountanous, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied,430 U.S. 954 (1977)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2nd Cir.); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 983 (1983).
76. 964 F.2d at 1325.
77. Id. at 1328.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1329.
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witness's psychiatric history in a criminal case would violate the
confrontation clause and vitiate a conviction.82
The Sixth Circuit recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
In re Zuniga.83 Citing the Supreme Court,84 the Zuniga court found that
Rule 501 authorized the federal circuits to develop the law of privileges
on a case-by-case basis.85 Having recognized the privilege, however, the
Zuniga court then determined that the privilege was inapplicable in the
instant case.86 Rather than attempt to define the scope of the privilege,
the court stated that "just as the recognition of privileges must be
undertaken on a case-by-case basis, so too must the scope of the
privilege." 87
Although both the Second and the Sixth Circuits recognize the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, they permit courts to decide in
individual cases whether the need for evidence outwei! s the need for
privacy. The Second Circuit held that the privilege only required that a
court consider a witness's privacy interest as an important factor to
weigh against the interest in eliciting relevant evidence from psychiatric
histories.88 Even though the opinions of courts in the Second and Sixth
Circuits may be well-reasoned in the context of a particular case, litigants
must prepare their cases amidst a high degree of uncertainty.
Although the psychotherapist-patient privilege is likely to remain
unrecognized in the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the contours of
the privilege will continue to gain definition in the Second and Sixth
Circuits. The chasm between the circuits will thus continue to deepen
with time unless Congress enacts specific rules on the psychotherapistpatient privilege. If Congress enacts new rules, it should decide whether
to make the privilege applicable in certain comraonly occurring
situations.

82. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (holding that refusing tc. allow the defendant to
cross-examine the key prosecution witness to show his probation status following a hearing on
juvenile delinquency violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, even
considering the state's policy of shielding juvenile records from public disclosure); Olden v.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (holding that the trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to crossexamine the complainant about her motive to lie violated the defendant's right of confrontation).
83. 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,464 U.S. 983 (1983).
84. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980).
85. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 637.
86. Id. at 640.
87. Id. at 639.
88. In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1992).
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I.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE

Assuming that Congress adopts a psychotherapist-patient privilege, it
should define the scope of the privilege by adopting exceptions. The
following discussion of state statutes and case law illustrates the wisdom
of establishing certain exceptions. Section A examines the exceptions
that are based on common law principles of privileges. Specifically, it
examines the exception for court-ordered examinations, 9 which is based
on the principle that a confidential relationship must exist before a
privilege is recognized. Section A also discusses the common law
principle of waiver, which justifies the exception for patient-litigants
who introduce their mental or emotional conditions as part of a claim or
defense.9" The formulation of specific rules to address these common
situations simplifies decisionmaking for courts. Section B examines
exceptions that simplify the task of reconciling the competing policies
behind the psychotherapist-patient privilege and other statutes. 9!
Specifically, the section focuses on the policies justifying the dangerous
patient and child abuse exceptions.
A.

Exceptions Based on the Requirement of a Confidential
Relationshipand Common Law Principlesof Waiver

1.

Exceptionfor Court-OrderedExaminations92

Assuming that Congress adopts a specific psychotherapist-patient
privilege, it should also create an exception for statements made during
court-ordered examinations. Court-ordered examinations fail to meet
two basic requirements of Wigmore's theory. Specifically, a defendant
who submits to a court-ordered mental examination neither
communicates for the purpose of treatment, nor enters into a confidential
relationship. The usual purpose of a court-ordered examination is to
enable the psychiatrist to inform the court of the defendant's mental
condition.93

89. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20B(b) (West 1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52146f(4) (West 1994).
93. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1017 (West 1994) (Law Revision Commission Comment).
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The need for this exception was evident in Massey v. State.94 In
Massey, a psychiatrist, whom the court appointed to determine the
defendant's sanity, testified about the statements that the defendant made
during the examination. The defendant attempted to claim the statutory
psychiatrist-patient privilege,95 but the court held that the privilege did

not apply. In this instance, the psychotherapist-patient relationship- did
not exist because no treatment was given or contemplated.96 The court
held that psychiatrists ordered to examine defendants may testify as to
the defendants' sanity because they act as witnesses for the court, rather
than for the prosecution.97
Because a criminal defendant's right against self-incrimination
protects statements that show guilt or innocence, psychiatrists may
disclose only a defendant's statements that are relevart to the issue of
sanity." The aim of a mental examination for a criminal defendant is to
resolve the question of sanity, not to determine guilt or innocence. 99 In
states that recognize the exception for court-ordered examinations, courts
advise defendants of their right against self-incrimination and notify
defense counsel before the examination takes place.'

94. 177 S.E.2d 79 (Ga. 1970), cert. denied,401 U.S. 964 (1971); see also In re Henderson, 29
Wash. App. 748, 630 P.2d 944 (1981) (concluding that a patient could not have reasonably expected
to have confidential relationships with two psychologists who evaluated her psychological condition
at the request of the court and the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation); Commonwealth v.
Lamb, 311 N.E.2d 47 (Mass. 1974) (declining to uphold the psychotherapist-patient privilege to
suppress the testimony of a court-appointed psychiatrist who communicated with a person in custody
at a treatment center for sexually dangerous persons; however, the psychiatist could testify only to
those communications that revealed the patient's mental condition, not guilt or innocence).
95. Ga. Code Ann. § 43-39-16 (Harrison 1993).
96. Massey v. State, 177 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1970) (citing Lifsey v. Mims, 20 S.E.2d 32 (Ga.
1942)); see also State v. Post, 118 Wash.2d 596, 613, 826 P.2d 172, 182, amended, 837 P.2d 599
(Wash. 1992) (en bane) (finding no psychologist-patient relationship when the psychologist
informed the criminal defendant that the interview would not be confidential because its purpose was
to enable the psychologist to make a recommendation to the Department of Corrections).
97. Massey, 177 S.E.2d at 81 (citing Jackson v. State, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969)).
98. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. Api. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 473
N.E.2d 1099 (Mass. 1985) (holding that the defendant's right against self-incrimination was violated
when a psychiatrist submitted to the prosecution a full account of the defendant's statements made
during a court-ordered examination, and the prosecution used these statements to show guilt).
99. Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
100. Id. See also Christenson v. State, 402 S.E.2d 41 (Ga.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 166 (1991)
(holding that the court order for a psychiatric examination of the defendant did not violate the
defendant's right against self-incrimination because the court notified the defendant's counsel and
advised the defendant of his rights).
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2.

Patient-LitigantException'0 '

Congress should also recognize a patient-litigant exception, which is
justified by the principle that a litigant waives the psychotherapist-patient
privilege by introducing his or her mental condition as an element of a
claim or defense. °2 State cases illustrate the need for strictly limiting
this exception to instances in which a litigant actively waives the
privilege.
For example, in the child support and child custody
proceeding of Peisach v. Antuna, °3 the husband tried to depose the
psychiatrist who had treated his ex-wife seven years earlier, claiming that
his ex-wife waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by denying his
allegations of mental instability and by stating that short-term therapy
seven years earlier had enabled her to be a better parent.' ° Contrary to
the husband's claims, the court held that not only was the wife's therapy
seven years earlier irrelevant to the issue of her present ability to care for
the children, but also the wife did not waive the privilege by merely

denying allegations of mental instability."0 5 The court reasoned that the
privilege would offer no protection for confidential communications if a
litigant could overcome the privilege simply by alleging mental

instability.' °6
B.

Exceptions Based on Policy Choices

In contrast to the exceptions for court-ordered examinations and
patient-litigants who place their mental or emotional conditions in issue,

101. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. StaL Ann. § 13-3993 (1993); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 20B(c)
(West 1994); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 20.02 (West 1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.503 (West 1994).
102. See, e.g., Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (applying the
exception to the psychiatrist-patient privilege where the wife, who suffered from emotional problems
at the time of the proceeding, alleged in her petition for dissolution that she was a fit and proper
person to have custody of the children); Wigmore, supra note 6, § 2327.
103. 539 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
104. Id. at 546.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Davidge v. Davidge, 451 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a
husband waived the privilege when he presented the testimony of psychiatrists to show that he was
mentally and emotionally incapacitated when he entered into a settlement agreement with his exwife, and thus he could not prevent his ex-wife from presenting the testimony of a psychiatrist who
had treated him contemporaneously with the execution of the agreement); but see Redding v.
Virginia Mason Med. Ctr., 75 Wash. App. 424, 428-429, 878 P.2d 483, 487 (1994) (holding that
patient-litigants waive the psychologist-patient privilege with respect to communications made
during joint counseling sessions if the communications are relevant to a litigated dispute between the

two).
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the dangerous patient and child abuse exceptions are based on the need to
further policies that conflict with the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Congress should recognize the dangerous patient end child abuse
exceptions in order to protect threatened victims from 5.oreseeable harm
and to protect children from abuse.
1.

1 7
DangerousPatientException 0

The dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege furthers the policy of preventing imminent physical harm. In
08
Menendez v. Superior Court,1
the court found that the facts of the case
called for application of the dangerous patient exception. First, the
Menendez brothers threatened their psychotherapist, his wife, and his
lover with physical harm." Second, the psychotherapist had reasonable
cause to believe, according to the standards of the psychotherapeutic
community, that disclosing the defendants' communications was
necessary to prevent imminent harm. 10 Because the psychotherapist
disclosed the patients' threats to his wife and his lover under the
dangerous patient exception, he was also able to testify to those
statements on the witness stand. Once the statement were disclosed,
they lost their privileged status."'
A possible drawback to the dangerous patient except.on is that during
psychiatric sessions patients may commonly make statements that could
lead their psychiatrists to believe that disclosure is necessary to prevent
imminent harm. Some fear that this exception could thus be applied to
so many statements that the dangerous patient exception would
effectively destroy the privilege." 2

107. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 233, § 20B(a) (West 1994).
108. 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992).
109. Id. at791.
110. Id. at 795. See also Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 346-47
(Cal. 1976) (justifying holding psychotherapists liable for failing to warn victims whom patients
threatened with serious physical harm, by citing the statutory dangerous patient exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and by referring to the Principles of Medical Ethics of the
American Medical Association, which permits psychotherapists to reveal communications if required
to do so by law or if the situation requires disclosure in order to protect an individual or a
community).
111. Menendez, 834 P.2d at 795. See also Wigmore, supra note 6, at § 2327.
112. See People v. Memro, 700 P.2d 446, 480 (Cal. 1985) (Grodin, J., cDncurring and dissenting)
(accusing the majority of sanctioning "wholesale invasion of privacy" by failing to insist upon a
threshold showing before applying the dangerous patient exception).
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Despite this possibility, state case law suggests that situations arise in
which the dangerous patient exception is necessary to protect threatened
persons from harm.
In Oringer v. Rotkin,"' a patient told a
psychotherapist of his plans to kill his son's schoolmate. The trial court
invoked the exception because it found that the psychotherapist's records
supported the conclusion that the patient presented a serious and
imminent danger. Similarly, in People v. Hopkins,'1 4 the court held that
the defendant could not claim the privilege because the psychiatrist had
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant was dangerous and that
disclosure was necessary to prevent harm. In Hopkins, the defendant
told his psychiatrist, as well as nurses at the mental health facility, that he
had participated earlier that day in a violent and abusive robbery of an
89-year-old woman." 5 These two cases illustrate how the dangerous
patient exception sacrifices the objectives behind the psychotherapistpatient privilege-privacy and the promotion of treatment for mental and
emotional illnesses-but does so in order to prevent foreseeable harm.
2.

ChildAbuse Exception1 6

Congress should establish a child abuse exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, which can be considered a subset of
the dangerous patient exception. Although society wishes to protect all
persons from foreseeable harm, it views the protection of children as a
particularly compelling interest that justifies abrogating the privilege.
Although many states establish an exception for cases of suspected child
abuse or neglect, the scope of the exception varies. Some state statutes
limit the exception to communications between the child and
psychologist;" 7 others extend the exception to communications between
a psychologist and an alleged child abuser."8
The first approach, which limits the exception to communications
made by abused children, offers the advantage of protecting the privacy
113. 556 N.Y.S.2d 67 (App. Div. 1990).
114. 119 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
115. Id. at 63. See also People v. Gomez, 185 Cal. Rptr. 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). Gomez was
convicted of murdering a man who Gomez believed had destroyed his marriage. Previously, Gomez
had threatened to kill his victim during sessions with psychology students working as interns. The
court held that even if the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to his communications with the
students, the dangerous patient exception permitted disclosure. Id. at 158-159
116. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-353 (1994); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.030 (1994).
117. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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of communications made by persons falsely accused of child abuse. In
addition, this approach may encourage child abusers to seek help by
maintaining the privileged status of statements that they make during
psychotherapeutic sessions. The disadvantage of this approach is that it
may prevent psychotherapists from revealing known cases of abuse.
For example, in Everett v. State,"9 the applicable statute permitted
only the disclosure of communications between abused children and their
psychotherapists.120 In Everett, the defendant told his psychotherapist
that he was participating in therapy because he felt remorse for sexually
abusing his stepdaughter. Even though the victim had written a note to
her mother about the abuse, the mother testified in court that the
defendant had sought therapy merely to obtain help n controlling his
temper. Despite the statutorily limited exception, the court was able to
permit disclosure because the defendant waived his privilege when he
asked his psychotherapist to tell the judge that he felt sincere remorse for
committing the crime.'
A statute that limits the exception to permit
only the disclosure of statements made by abused children, rather than by
abusers, thus presents the problem that known cases of abuse may go
unreported.
The second approach, which extends the child abuse exception to
communications from child abusers, as well as from abused children,
ensures that known cases of abuse are disclosed. An advantage to this
approach is that the psychotherapist in Everett would have been able to
expose the sexual abuse even if the defendant had not waived the
privilege. A disadvantage is that the exception may discourage abusers
Thus, a legislature that permits a
from seeking therapy."z
psychotherapist to disclose the communications of child abusers chooses
to protect children by discovering child abusers and removing children
from their reach rather than by encouraging child abusers to seek
treatment."
The second, more expansive approach is the wiser of the two. Despite
the possible effectiveness of psychotherapy, treatment may fail to reform

119. 572 So. 2d 838 (Miss. 1990).
120. Id. at 839 (applying the child abuse exception established in Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-353
(Supp. 1989)).
121. Id. at 840.
122. Id. at 839.
123. Carson v. Jackson, 466 So. 2d 1188, 1190-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (applying Fla. Stat.
ch. 415.512 (1983), which abrogates the privilege in any situation involving known or suspected
child abuse or neglect).
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the child abuser's behavior. In contrast, reporting the abuse and
removing the child from the reach of the abuser will almost certainly
protect the child from further harm. Without the child abuse exception, a
defendant who tells his psychotherapist that he engaged in sexual
conduct with his minor child could successfully use the privilege to
prevent his psychotherapist from testifying against him.t24
In addition to the policy of protecting children, the enactment of
statutes that require health care professionals to report child abuse
When legislatures
justifies establishing a child abuse exception."
explicitly recognize this exception, they relieve courts of the need to
reconcile the competing policies behind the psychotherapist-patient
privilege and mandatory reporting of child abuse. The exception thus
of child abuse claims more reliable and more
makes adjudication
26
efficient.
Other issues arise when the person who wishes to disclose
communications is not the psychotherapist who suspects child abuse, but
is instead the defendant charged with child abuse who wants to disclose
the psychiatric files of the alleged victim. State courts have attempted to
apply the psychotherapist-patient privilege in conjunction with other
rules of evidence in a way that is fair to both the defendant and the
victim. If a defendant fails to prove that the accuser's psychiatric record
is relevant to credibility, then courts respect the accuser's privacy and
refuse to review the record in camera.2 7 In some cases, however, the
criminal defendant's constitutional right of confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment overrides the victim's psychotherapist-patient privilege. For
124. See People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725 (Colo. CL App. 1991). Bowman was decided before
Colorado established a child abuse exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The defendant
told an alcohol facility social worker that he had engaged in sexual conduct with his minor
stepdaughter. The court held that the communications were privileged, and that the trial court had
erred in admitting the statements. However, the error was harmless because of the overwhelming
evidence against the defendant. Id. at 729.
125. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 11166 (West 1994) ("Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act").
126. See, e.g., People v. Caplan, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (referring to a lower
court's comments on the difficulty in understanding the scope of the privilege in light of the child
abuse reporting statute).
127. See, &g., People v. Manzanillo, 546 N.Y.S.2d 954 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (rejecting the
defendant's request for permission to search the victim's psychological evaluations for information
that could harm the victim's credibility because the defendant failed to show that the records were
likely to be relevant); see also People v. Tissois, 516 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div.), aff'di 526 N.E.2d
1086 (N.Y. 1987) (denying the defendant's request for access to a social worker's notes, which she
made after visiting the children who accused the defendant of sexually abusing them, because the
defendant failed to show that the notes were likely to be relevant to the issue of the children's
credibility.)
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example, in People v. Caplan, the prosecution presented the testimony
of two psychiatrists who had treated the ten-year-old victim, and the
defendant explained why he needed the notes of another psychiatrist who
had treated the child to prepare and present a defense. 28 Under these
facts, the lower court erred in failing to review in camera the psychiatric
129
records subpoenaed by the defendant.
Subsequent to a sufficient showing by the defendant, an in camera
examination seems to be a compromise between the interests of
defendants and accusers. When courts examine psychiatric records in
camera, rather than in a public courtroom, the hifringement upon
patients' privacy is minimal. At the same time, courts can determine
whether the psychiatric histories of the accusers affecT: the credibility of
their accusations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress should adopt an explicit psychotherapist-patient privilege to
promote uniform, efficient application of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in the federal courts. Rulemakers now have a substantial body
of state statutes and case law on the privilege that they can use as models
for a federal rule. Furthermore, Congress will soon be considering
amendments to the current rules based on a comprehensive study by the
Judicial Conference of the130United States Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
The above discussion of exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in the state courts has attempted to show that four situations, in
particular, arise frequently enough to justify establishing clear exceptions
for them. These situations arise when a judge believes that a litigant may
be mentally incapable of standing trial, a litigant introduces a mental or
emotional condition as part of a claim or defense, a patient presents a
grave and imminent physical threat to a specific victim, and a
psychotherapist learns that a patient is abusing a child.
The best way for rulemakers to develop prudent guidelines for
applying the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to refer to the
experiences of state courts that apply statutory provisions. These
provisions help define the contours of the psychotherapist-patient
128. 238 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Ct. App. 1987).
129. Id. at 486.
130. Anthony E. DiResta, Committee to Evaluate Basis for Evidentiary Privileges, Litigation
News, Oct. 1993, at 2.
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privilege by establishing specific exceptions, and these contours are
further defined when courts apply the provisions in specific factual
contexts.

